Suchergebnisse

This study tested partisan media effects in the 2014 U.S. midterm elections. A survey was distributed to 992 residents of Georgia, Iowa, and North Carolina. A novel multigroup latent variable structural equation model tested the direct, indirect, and conditional effects of political interest, partisan media use, political information efficacy, and partisanship on affective polarization. Findings demonstrated a polarizing effect of pro-partisan media, a depolarizing effect of cross-cutting media, and an indirect effect of political interest on polarization through partisan media use. There was no evidence that the effects of partisan media were mediated through political confidence or moderated by partisanship.

In spite of growing concerns about political extremism, no adequate measure exists to empirically test the character of political attitudes. The purpose of this study was to develop a measurement of political attitude extremism and, using this measure, assess the communication phenomena that contribute to political extremism. To this end, two surveys were distributed to a total of 504 participants (316 for Study 1 and 188 for Study 2). Study 1 assessed the properties of political attitude extremism. The second study used the measure developed in Study 1 to determine the extent to which media habits, homogeneity of social networks, partisan polarization, political information efficacy, political talk, and moral certainty contribute to political attitude extremism. Study 1 found that liberal attitude extremism and conservative attitude extremism are not opposite ends of the same spectrum but rather are distinct variables with unique measurement properties. Furthermore, conservative attitude extremism must be subdivided into fiscal conservative extremism and social conservative extremism, while liberalism did not require such a division. Study 2 found that these three extremism variables (liberal attitude extremism, social conservative attitude extremism, fiscal conservative attitude extremism) behave differently relative to the communication phenomenon examined. Specifically, ideological media use and political talk significantly predicted liberal attitude extremism, homogeneity of social network and partisan polarization significantly predicted social conservative attitude extremism, and partisan polarization and political information efficacy significantly predicted fiscal conservative attitude extremism. These findings demonstrate that scholarship must consider attitude extremism as multifaceted and must adjust theory accordingly. The new measurement tools provided by this study represent a significant advancement in the empirical study of political extremism.

Political violence, while rare, continues to be a concern. Yet scholars have only recently begun testing the effects language might have on support for violence. This project examines whether different types of verbal political attacks—those related to personal- and public-level incivility—affect support for violence through perceptions of impoliteness and attributions of out-group malevolence. Two experiments conducted in the United States test the effects of political attacks in two contexts: Twitter and issue speeches. Across both studies, both types of attacks prompted perceptions of impoliteness and attributions of malevolence. In the speech context, both types of political attacks decreased support for violence through impoliteness perceptions, and personal-level incivility increased identification with violent likeminded protesters through malevolence attributions. Optimistically, attacks may make social norms salient to individuals, decreasing their support for other social norm violations, like violence. Less optimistically, attacks may increase identification with groups fighting back against the verbal attacker.

The 2012 election was marked by discussions of women's issues from abortion to equal pay, and both presidential candidates employed strategies designed to win female voters. Since women vote in larger numbers than men and are more likely to be swing voters, it was imperative that the candidates win support among women. This study draws from group identification theories to better understand the process of gender socialization that influences young women's perceptions of candidates and the effect of targeted advertising. The findings of this study build upon existing group identification theory and suggest the need for more nuanced theories of female voters that take into consideration identification with one's gender group as well as beliefs about women's roles in society. Specifically, this study found that strong gender group identification was associated with higher favorability ratings of Obama. Women holding more egalitarian gender role beliefs were also more likely to rate Obama favorably. Gender group identification did not influence ratings of Romney, but women with more traditional gender role beliefs rated Romney more favorably. No direct support was found for an effect of targeted political advertising in this study, however, we argue that additional research is needed in this area.

"Leading scholars analyze three disruptions in the 2020 presidential campaign and election: disruptions to the status quo caused by the renewed quest for racial justice and greater diversity of candidates, pandemic disruptions to traditional campaigning, and disruptions to democratic norms"--

"This book will analyze the political communication content and effects of the 2016 election to assess the extent to which political polarization, gender dynamics, racial and regional division, hostility toward outgroups, incivility, and trends in political media explain and are explained by the 2016 election"--

Researchers have noted that an individual's processing of political media messages occurs through various filters including partisanship, interest, and cynicism. The phenomenon of motivated processing, however, is understudied particularly in the context of televised presidential debates. As major campaign events, presidential debates have been linked to increases in viewers' political knowledge, political information efficacy, and changes in candidate evaluation. Yet individual's information processing, largely unexplored in the extant debate literature, may well influence these outcomes. In the present study, we manipulate processing of a political debate and monitor the effects through participant engagement with social media. Researchers asked debate viewers to tweet while watching 2016 Democrat and Republican presidential primary debates following instructions designed to prime either directional motivated processing or accuracy motivated processing. The results demonstrate that the accuracy prompt reduced issue-based tweeting and therefore reduced knowledge acquisition. Conversely, the directional prompt increased issue-based tweeting and therefore increased knowledge acquisition.

This study of the 2008 first presidential and vice presidential debate builds on past research on viewers' perceptions of candidate images. Going back to the Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960, image research has been conducted in most presidential election cycles. Findings consistently show that viewers enter the debates with perceptions of candidates' character and leadership qualities and that the debates tend to reinforce rather than change images unless the viewers are undecided or not well informed about a candidate. The results of the 2008 study confirmed trends from past research but also provided some surprises in that most changes in image perception were for senator Joe Biden, the longest-serving public official in the race. The study concludes that media often assume knowledge about candidates that might not exist and that in the 2008 match-ups, the debates did not provide the "game changer" that the McCain-Palin ticket needed to overcome a growing movement toward the Obama-Biden ticket that began shortly before the first debate.

This study presents the results of a quasi-experiment to assess the effects of viewing a strategically manipulated portion of a 2020 Democratic Primary debate. Our aim was to assess the polarizing potential of primary debates on both ingroup (Democratic) and outgroup (Republican) viewers. Viewing the primary debate resulted in less perceived closeness with members of the opposing political party, greater feelings of social distance, and more attribution of malevolent intentions. These effects were consistent regardless of whether the viewer was a member of the political ingroup (Democrats) or outgroup (Republicans). Conversely, there was no effect of debate viewing on evaluations of outparty candidates (with respect to negative trait attributions or lower feeling thermometer evaluations)., nor did support for political compromise change as a result of viewing the debate. Both Democrats and independents reported improved evaluations of participating candidates, though Republican evaluations did not change.